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A B S T R A C T
Education began to be included as a component of foreign assistance in the early 1960s as it is a principal
ingredient of development. A number of multilateral and bilateral agencies were established around this
time to implement various types of aid programmes; however, their effectiveness is constantly being
questioned and challenged due to a variety of problems. This paper reviews the past and current
activities of bilateral, multilateral organizations and private donors in education aid, examines their
effectiveness, discusses major problems in implementing educational programmes and suggests ways to
improve aid in education.
 2015 UNU-WIDER. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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Education has been found to have two categories of inﬂuences.
In terms of monetary inﬂuences, the higher an individual’s level of
education, the less likely they will be unemployed or in poverty,
and the more likely they will have better advantages in terms of
income and income security. Moreover, what is true of individuals
is also true of communities and nations. In terms of non-monetary
inﬂuences, education has been found to affect personal health and
nutrition practices, childrearing and participation in voluntary
activities. It also inﬂuences the efﬁciency of public communica-
tions and the degree to which adults seek new knowledge and
skills over a lifetime (Blaug, 1978; Schultz, 1982; McMahon, 1999).
How communities learn, therefore, is a principal ingredient of
their development. In modern economies, schools and universities
are the primary means by which knowledge is passed to new
generations and how new knowledge is systematically incorpo-
rated (World Bank, 1995).
Education was ﬁrst included as a component of foreign
assistance in the early 1960s. Initially, education aid was deployed
to support workforce development plans, so programmes empha-
sized vocational training, engineering education and immediately
applicable workskills. Infrastructure investments such as high-
ways, railroads, dams, bridges and agricultural and industrial
machinery were still the most important priorities of development
aid, but they needed skilled maintenance. Education aid was a way* Corresponding author.
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4.0/).to make sure the necessary skills were locally available (Heyne-
man, 2004a).
By the 1980s, education aid had grown to include primary and
secondary education, humanities and social sciences, professional
education and education research. The shift was triggered by the
World Bank’s publication of an education policy paper in 1980 that
diversiﬁed the analytic models for assessing education outcomes
beyond forecasting manpower needs to include calculating the
economic rates of return on education investments (World Bank,
1980; Heyneman, 2009, 2010). A common ﬁnding was that
primary education had the highest economic returns, leading to
calls for public ﬁnancing to shift from higher to primary education,
and for higher education to be ﬁnanced by raising private costs
through tuition (Psacharopoulos et al., 1986).
That was followed in the 1990s by an approach known as
‘education for all’, with strong emphasis placed by donors on
primary education (UNESCO, 2007). This approach has since
become the dominant paradigm of education aid, with signiﬁcant
and often negative consequences for the sector as a whole
(Heyneman, 2009, 2010, 2012a).
2. Institutional architecture1
Foreign assistance began after Second World War for reasons of
reconstruction, political inﬂuence and altruism. In general foreign
aid began with the introduction of the Marshall Plan by the United
States, a transfer of US$13 billion between 1948 and 1952 to
support the reconstruction of 14 European countries, with the UK
receiving the highest percentage (24 per cent) and Norway1 Adapted from Heyneman (2012b).
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
Table 1
Total ODA to education from 1995 to 2011.
Year Total ODA Total ODA to education % Educational ODA
1995 57,556.47 2,888.24 5
1996 63,690.44 4,325.83 7
1997 60,510.82 4,682.08 8
1998 70,059.01 4,844.90 7
1999 77,356.45 6,403.74 8
2000 83,743.78 6,376.74 8
2001 84,861.80 6,456.63 8
2002 97,168.91 7,929.27 8
2003 114,455.73 9,128.38 8
2004 115,867.07 10,828.82 9
2005 141,228.59 8,489.96 6
2006 146,401.38 11,529.41 8
2007 135,025.36 11,611.16 9
2008 155,755.59 11,485.99 7
2009 161,627.96 13,408.07 8
2010 163,512.42 13,344.09 8
2011 148,906.84 11,030.09 7
Note: Constant prices 2010 US$ million. All donors’ commitment to developing
countries reported to OECD.
Source: The ﬁgures for total ODA are derived from OECD/CRS database and the
amount is different than that from the ofﬁcial EFA Global Monitoring Report due to
different method of calculation. Thus, the portion of education ODA is slightly
smaller than the ofﬁcial ﬁgures in EFA Global Monitoring Report.
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Fig. 1. Per cent of education ODA as of total ODA, 1995–2011. Source: OECD/CRS.
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person) (Moyo, 2009: 12). The ﬁrst multilateral organizations
consisted of UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF and the World Bank (Singh,
2011). Current major multilateral aid providers include the World
Bank (US$1.7 billion), UNICEF (US$709 million), the Asian
Development Bank (US$647 million) and the Inter-American
Development Bank (US$465 million), JICA (US$185m), USAID
(US$1.3 billion), DFID (US$960 million) (See the table in annex II).
In 2010, approximately three-fourths of education aid ﬂows
through bilateral organizations and 26 per cent through multi-
laterals (OECD CRS database). Of the multilaterals, the World Bank
historically has allocated the largest portion, the EU allocates the
second largest portion (OECD CRS). In terms of its size within
organizational budgets, education aid is generally around 4 per
cent: 4 per cent at the World Bank (Table 2) and the Inter-American
Bank, 4.8 per cent at the Asian Development Bank and 5.8 per cent
from the EU. Surprisingly, perhaps, the African Development Bank
allocates the lowest portion to education, at just 0.9 per cent.
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy explained foreign aid to assist
low-income countries ‘not because the communists are doing it,
but because it is right’ (quoted in Sartorius and Ruttan 1988: 4).
However, over time, foreign aid frequently combined political with
humanitarian motives. In general the political motives of multilat-
eral organizations associated with the United Nations were less
manifest in part because projects and strategies had to be a product
of consensus across multiple interests, including those of aid
recipient countries as well as those of donor countries. On the other
hand, because bilateral agencies reﬂected national foreign aid
priorities, bilateral assistance, the national origin of consultants as
well as the political and economic objectives tend to reﬂect those
of the donor. These tendencies are not uniform however; some
bilateral agencies tend to be quite agnostic with respect to the
origins of consultants while others tend to be quite restrictive.
However, no bilateral agency allows its assistance to be directed
toward humanitarian needs alone without the inﬂuence of political
or economic interest. These characteristics, moreover, pertain to
new bilateral organizations in China, Russia, Korea and Brazil as well
as the older ones in Europe and North America.
Bilateral organizations are those whose development projects
are arranged country-by-country. The assistance which ﬂows
through bilateral organizations is distinct from that which ﬂows
through multilateral organizations. Bilateral assistance is part of adonor nation’s foreign policy. For instance, the US, in 2004,
allocated the majority of its bilateral assistance to Iraq, Israel, West
Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Jordan and Afghanistan (OECD-DAC). Also,
among the top ten recipients of French bilateral aid, seven
countries are either French speaking countries (Congo, Rep, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Senegal), or French territories (Mayotte), or members of
the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) (Morocco,
Vietnam, Lebanon) (OECD-DAC)
Bilateral education aid has expanded during the 1960s to 1990s.
It totalled US$3.4 billion in 1965, to up to US$6 billion in 1980, and
then to US$3.9 billion (constant 1994 US$) in 1995 (Mundy, 2006).
However, Fig. 1 below shows that the increase was slow since the
late 1990s. Fig. 1 demonstrates that in 2011, education aid
accounts for US$11 billion (constant 2010 US$) worldwide, or
about 8 per cent of total ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA).
Among national aid organizations, major donors include the US
Agency for International Development (US$1.3 billion), the UK’s
Department for International Development (US$960 million) and
Japan’s JICA (US$185 million). However, the portion of develop-
ment aid dedicated to education by western aid agencies is
relatively small, at just 3 per cent for both USAID and Norway’s
development agency, NORAD, and 4 per cent for Sweden’s SIDA. By
contrast, education is more of an aid priority for many bilateral
agencies in Asia, with JICA devoting 14 per cent of its aid budget to
education, Australia’s AusAid 17 per cent and South Korea’s KOICA
25 per cent.
Why do Japan and South Korea emphasize education in their
foreign aid? Both economies have emerged as a result of large
investments in human capital. But one explanation at least as far as
Japan is concerned, is not being associated with ‘trying to sell their
products’. Education has a reputation of being less controversial
than the sectors. Emphasis on education may lower the risk of
criticism of aid serving donor’s self-interest.
Bilateral organizations tend to emphasize aspects of education
aid that are particularly popular or strategic to domestic interests.
These may include particular areas, such as technical schools or
folk development colleges, as well as particular reforms and
innovations, such as bilingual education, televised education and
diversiﬁed education (Heyneman, 2006a).
Though basic education continues to dominate education
political objectives, funding is also directed towards a wide variety
of other priorities. These include secondary education, teacher
training, adult education and literacy, science education, voca-
tional skills and higher education (OECD-CRS). In many cases,
private foundations and nongovernmental organizations focus on
particular areas. For instance, the Ford and Carnegie Foundations
have concentrated on higher education, while the Open Society
Institute (sometime called the Soros Foundation) has focused on
primary and secondary education, and on civics education in
particular. Many organizations fund particular areas of education
Table 2
Foreign assistance to education from selected major multilateral and regional organizations.
Major priorities in education Year of
establishment
Monetary commitment
in education US$ mn
% of overall
activities on
education
Source
EU/Europe Aid
Post-secondary education,
education level unspeciﬁed,
basic education
1949 770.238* 5.8 2011 Annual Report European Commission
Asian Development Bank
Improving student results and
completion rate in education,
ﬁnancing for higher education
1966 647 4.8 ADB Annual Report 2011, Asian Development Bank
Africa Development Bank
Higher education, science,
technology and vocational training
1964 6.13** 0.9 2011 Annual Report, Africa Development Bank-Africa
Development Fund
Inter-American Development Bank
Primary, secondary education,
quality education
1959 465 4 2011 Annual Report, The Year in Review, Inter-American
Development Bank
World Bank
Basic education, higher education,
vocational, in-service training,
pre-school
1944 1,733 4 World Bank, Annual Report 2011, Year in Review,
World Bank
Total amount: 3.98 UA millions.
Source: Created by authors based on annual reports of each organization.
* Notes for 1 Euro = US$1.23.
** Notes for 1 UA = 1.54 (as of 2010).
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Agriculture Organization funds rural education, for instance, and
the World Health Organization funds education related to health.
Charitable foundations actively participate in international
education. They supply goods and services, experiment with new
institutions, lobby for new policies and generate new initiatives.
About 80 per cent of them are American (Heyneman, 2005)
because charitable giving in the US is supported by the tax code
and there is a relatively low marginal tax on income which
facilitates personal wealth. American foundations tend to be
larger and older than those elsewhere.
Religious philanthropy2 remains a common conduit for
education. These can be ﬁnanced either through public or private
resources. Public schools managed by religious organizations are
common throughout Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia.
For the most part these are afﬁliated with Christian churches. But
in the Middle East and North Africa, and in parts of the former
Soviet Union, schools can be afﬁliated with mosques and in South
Asia, with Buddhist temples. Wherever schools are managed by
religious organizations it is common for parents and community
leaders to garner support for their programmes through voluntary
donations of labour and capital. Catholics often provide interna-
tional assistance through Caritas; Protestants through Christian
Aid and World Vision. Among Muslims, the Zakat (charitable
donations) is assumed to be about 2.5 per cent of an individual’s
annual income and has ﬁnanced hospitals, schools, public water
supply and other public services. Religious norms, called Waqf, are
the Koran’s method for allocating personal wealth properly, which
are often overseen by state institutions. In the case of Pakistan, for
instance, the central government ministry of Waqf manages
charitable activities (Richardson, 2004: 156).
2.1. Non-DAC donors
In recent years, some new donor countries have become
providers of education assistance to middle and low-income2 Religious philanthropy shows religious purposes as their mission statement,
whereas charitable foundations do not explicitly show religious purpose in their
mission statements. Save the Children and CARE are examples of charitable
foundations. Caritas is an illustration of a religious (Catholic) philanthropy.countries. Do they have particular contributions to make? China’s
contribution, for example, has been limited to (i) Confucius
institutes (a rough equivalent to USIS or the British Council), (ii)
scholarships to study in China; (iii) construction of individual
schools and (iv) stand-alone education projects (Nordtveit, 2011).
King (2010) notes that China’s training role in Kenya has met with
considerable demand by Kenyans to learn Chinese and is closely
related to the growth of Chinese business and foreign direct
investment. The Asia Foundation (2014) points out that education
aid is representative of ‘soft power’, a means by which countries
might have an inﬂuence but with a low risk of being accused of
‘economic imperialism’. Is education special because it is now
considered by new donors in Asia?
The education sector is the second largest in Korea’s aid
portfolio (Watson, 2012). Chung (2013) points out that
vocational education is the predominant purpose within educa-
tion assistance, which underpins Korea’s intention to utilize
education for its instrumental value. He speculates that the
lack of education policy experts with developing country
experience, the lessons of Korea’s own history of using vocational
education to spur economic growth, and the fact that vocational
education is relatively ‘safe’ from cultural sensitivities, all
help underpin South Korea’s education policies and priorities
(Chung, 2013).
There is education assistance too from the Russian Federation.
However, ofﬁcial statistics from Russia are not broken down by
sector (Curry, 1989; Maximova et al., 2013), so other than to
suggest that current assistance is largely predicated on concep-
tions of education during the Soviet era (Takala and Piattoeva,
2012), it is difﬁcult assess its direction or impact. However, Russia
has created a trust fund at the World Bank titled Russia Education
Aid for Development Trust Fund (READ) whose purpose is to assist
low-income countries in developing student learning assessment
including their participation in TIMSS and PISA (READ Annual
Report 2013). There are many possible reasons for this speciﬁc
interest. One might be to expose Russian analysts to the logistical
details of achievement surveys. Another might be to encourage
countries in the ‘near abroad’ to participate in achievement
surveys. In sum, new donors in the education sector to date do
not seem to have broken new ground or led into unanticipated
directions.
Table 3
Ranking of donors on aid effort and quality.
Aid quality indexes
Donor country Aid efforta Poverty elasticity (Dollar and Levin, 2004) Policy elasticity (Dollar and Levin, 2004) Composite (Roodman, 2004)
Denmark 1 1 1 3
UK 3 3 2 1
Norway 2 2 3 5
France 4 5 6 2
US 6 4 5 4
Japan 5 6 4 6
Source: Based on Klein and Harford (2005), Dollar and Levin (2004) and Roodman (2004).
a Aid effort is measured by ODA as a percentage of the donor country’s GNI. The data are from the World Bank (2004).
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The doubts and concerns over the effectiveness of education aid
mirror those which pertain to aid more generally. Like aid in general,
the assumption has been that it would be more effective if (i) spent in
very poor countries, (ii) in countries with good policies and strong
institutions, and (iii) in countries with strong mechanisms of
allocation (Klein and Harford: 2005: 36-7). In terms of bilateral
donors, agencies with reputations for effectively delivering pro-
gramme for the intended purposes (the United Kingdom and
Denmark) may outrank agencies with reputations for being the least
effective (Japan and the United States) (Klein and Harford: 39).
There are many illustrations of aid waste. In one case, less than one
per cent of assistance to a ministry of health was found to actually
reach health clinics (Collier, 2007: 102); 11 per cent of aid has been
found to actually ﬁnance the military (Collier, 2007: 103); and when
allocated on the basis of ex ante policy conditionality, donors have
been found to allocate aid in spite of the lack of commitment on the
part of the recipient (Collier, 2007: 108). Some have drawn a link
between aid and corruption both in the recipient countries and in the
donor agency (Klees et al., 2012; Cullen, 2008: 110; Heyneman et al.,
2008), leading to a distrust of international ﬁnancial institutions
(Cullen, 2008: 118). Some, including Africans (Moyo, 2009) have
suggested that aid is dysfunctional (Calderisi, 2006; Collier, 2007: 99)
and should be replaced by trade (Easterly, 2006).
Aid effectiveness is difﬁcult to measure (Cullen, 2008: 24).
Evaluations may assess particular projects or programmes and
sometimes these may lead to clear conclusions3. Some agencies
have been found to have been more effective in implementing
projects than other agencies. Effective implementation seems to
be particularly the case with Britain, but less so with respect to
Norway and the US (see Table 3).
Channing et al. (2011) argue that general development aid helps
to stimulate growth and reduce poverty through physical capital
investments and improvements in health. Focusing on aid to
primary education, Birchler and Michaelowa (2013) argue that aid
has led to ‘modest but non-negligible’ improvement in enrolment
but not necessarily to improved learning. However it has proven
difﬁcult to assess the effectiveness of education aid for several
reasons. Birchler and Michaelowa struggle with the possibility of
‘reverse causality’, the problem that higher enrolment may attract
larger aid rather than the other way around. They are also challenged
by problems of inter-sub-sector complementarities. They begin by
treating aid to other parts of the education sector as a sign of
‘inefﬁciency’ but in the end they acknowledge that aid to support
higher education may augment the performance at lower levels4.3 See, for example, Glewwe et al. (2004), Heyneman et al. (1984), Pandey et al.
(2011), Glewwe, (ed., 2014), Oketch et al. (2010).
4 Development specialists have often assumed that assistance to primary
education should take precedence over aid to higher education when in fact public
investments in higher education in the United States helped stimulate demand for
primary and secondary education (Bowman, 1962).Other difﬁculties include the possibility that education aid has
supplanted normal government funding rather than added to it
and the problem that there may be complexities of sequencing and
thresholds. For instance, Collier (2007: 100) suggests that rates of
primary school completion climbed to 100 per cent of the age
cohort in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand in spite of the fact that
these countries received no aid for primary education, and that
completion rates have increased substantially in India and Brazil
where external assistance is a small fraction of domestic education
expenditures. The conclusion is that, in many circumstances aid is
unnecessary to achieve high education outcomes. In addition, even
in low-income countries highly dependent on aid, the impact of aid
on education outcomes is modest but non-trivial. While that as a
result may be sufﬁcient outcome for some who are employed in the
aid industry, it may not prove sufﬁcient for public taxpayers in
donor countries who have multiple alternative uses for the
allocation of their resources.
A useful indicator of aid outcomes might be the stability of an
aid-receiving country’s institutions. This may include the degree to
which courts can remain independent; the degree to which
elections can be held fairly; the possibility that university entrance
examinations can be administered without corruption (Heyne-
man, 2004b; 2002/3). For example, in Malawi, a country that
receives high levels of aid and has stable institutions, primary
school enrolment rates have climbed from 21 per cent in 1975 to
66 per cent in 2010 (Figs. 10 and 11). However, in Liberia, a country
with weak institutions, completion rates have fallen from 69 per
cent in 1976 to 62 per cent today, in spite of high aid levels.
Secondary school enrolment suggests a similar pattern. Signiﬁcant
increases are experienced by countries with no aid, with low aid
and with high aid if they have strong institutions. But secondary
school enrolment rates remain ﬂat or increase at a lower rate in
high-aid countries with weak institutions. This lack of a clear link
between aid and education outcomes has raised questions as to its
effectiveness.
4. Research on the effectiveness of aid on educational
outcomes
Despite the lack of data and difﬁculties to measure the
effectiveness of aid, quite a large body of literature exists on
assessing aid on economic growth. Unlike the research on aid
effectiveness on economic growth, which began in the mid-1980s,
there are few studies on aid effectiveness on educational outcomes.
However, it is important to note that many of the successful
interventions were educational programmes. Studies that analyse
the effect of educational interventions in developing countries
have found positive effects. Duﬂo (2001), who analyses aid-
ﬁnanced primary school expansion in Indonesia, ﬁnds substantial
increases in educational attainment and higher wages for the
graduates. Evidence from randomized experiments in India
showed that a remedial education programme increased average
test scores of treatment schools and a computer assisted learning
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(Banerjee et al., 2005). Even the most severe critics of foreign aid,
like Easterly, acknowledge positive effects of educational inter-
vention programmes.
There are an increasing number of studies that assess the impact
of educational intervention in developing countries through
randomized controlled trials or quasi-experiments. Though the
intervention programs are not always funded by foreign aid, it is
crucial to note some lessons learned from these studies. A number
of studies have systematically reviewed and attempted to ﬁnd
implications for education policies from the studies of randomized
control trials, quasi-experiments/natural experiments (Glewwe,
2002; Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Kremer and Holla, 2009; Glewwe
et al., 2014; Masino and Nino-Zarazua, 2015). These studies
generally concluded that reducing the cost of education and
providing school-based health programs increased school partici-
pation (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Kremer and Holla, 2009),
however, the supply-side interventions themselves are found to
be ineffective in improving education quality and are most effective
when they are complemented with community participation or
incentive programs (Masino and Nino-Zarazua, 2015).
Findings from meta-analysis overall also show similar lessons
though some interventions have mixed evidence to draw
conclusion (Petrosino et al., 2012; Krishnaratne et al., 2013;
McEwan, 2014). For increasing school participation, the condi-
tional cash transfer programs, new schools and infrastructure
building interventions as well as school feeding programs had
positive effect (Petrosino et al., 2012; Krishnaratne et al., 2013).
Krishnaratne et al. (2013) ‘s study found that better infrastructure
building had positive impact on increasing both student atten-
dance and learning outcomes. However, the analyses showed that
interventions to reduce schooling fees and subsidy programs do
not necessarily improved student learning outcomes (Krishnaratne
et al., 2013; McEwan, 2014). Teaching resources such as additional
teachers and computer-assisted learning were found to be most
effective on learning outcomes (Krishnaratne et al., 2013; McEwan,
2014). Other interventions such as merit-based scholarships,
school-based management, and information to parents on
schooling can also have positive impact on learning outcomes
but evidence was not strong (Krishnaratne et al., 2013).
The evidence on effectiveness is becoming increasingly more
precise over time. In spite of the improvement in precision
however, two problems have emerged. The ﬁrst is that precision
does not guarantee insightful results. In one summary article the
main conclusions have been that a ‘‘fully functioning school (desks,
roofs, walls, and a library) is ‘conducive to student learning’’ and
that ‘‘teacher absence has a clear negative effect on learning.’’
(Glewwe et al., 2014, p. 47). One wonders why such high powered
expertise and expense is needed to reach a long-standing and well
known result.
The other problem has to do with the limits on evidence-based
policy. High quality evidence cannot be simply deﬁned by the use
of quasi-experimental (i.e. regression discontinuity differences in
differences) or experimental studies such as randomized con-
trolled trial methods because the associations are not so straight
forward. They cannot control for the ‘‘totality of individual
characteristics and the broad range of contextual factors that
may affect program development and its outputs. economic
approaches are good for identifying outcomes, but not necessarily
the social mechanisms behind the relationships (Verger and
Zancajo 2015, p. 368 and p. 370). These limits are recognized by
many economists, but the correct balance between precision on
outputs and explanations of why those outputs occur is undevel-
oped (Heyneman, 2014; Burde, 2014).
It is also relatively recent that economists began to conduct
macro-level studies on the effectiveness of educational aid. Manyof the studies ﬁnd positive effect of aid on educational outcomes;
however, the magnitude of the effect is modest. Michaelowa and
Weber’s study (2006) examines the impact of aid for education on
primary enrolment rates over time in eighty low-income countries.
They conducted a dynamic panel analysis using primary school
enrolment, ODA and other country-level data from the World Bank.
Their results were presented in two datasets: a long-term structural
panel (ﬁve-year averages, 1975–2000) and a short-term annual
panel (1993–2000). They ﬁnd a positive overall effect of develop-
ment assistance on primary enrolment; however, educational aid
was more effective when coupled with good governance.
Another Michaelowa and Weber’s study (2008) also examines
the aid effectiveness on primary, secondary and tertiary education
enrolments. They used a short-term annual panel from 1999 to
2004, and a panel starting in the early 1990s to 2004. Their study
shows some positive effect of aid at all three levels (primary,
secondary and tertiary) of education; however, the overall effects
are bound to be quite low.
Dreher et al. (2008) analyse the impact of aid on education for
almost 100 countries over 1970 to 2004. They ﬁnd that higher per
capita aid for education signiﬁcantly increases primary school
enrolment, while increased domestic government spending on
education does not. This result was robust to the use of
instruments to control for the endogeneity of aid, and the set of
control variables included in the estimation.
However, Christensen et al’s, study (2012) shows a negative
effect of education aid on enrolment. The study uses both ODA and
non ODA data to test the effectiveness of primary education aid on
primary school enrolment rate, and the data cover 109 low- and
low-middle income countries from 1975 to 2005. Results from a
latent growth model and panel regression models show that
primary education aid is not related to primary enrolment rates in
a statistically signiﬁcant way.
Thus, the research results on measuring the impact of aid on
educational outcomes are inconclusive. Although more studies
show a modest positive relationship between education aid and
enrolment, the estimated effects are rather low and are sensitive to
different model speciﬁcations (Michaelowa and Weber, 2006). The
relationship between aid and economic growth is much more
contested than aid on education outcomes. Implications from the
effect of aid on economic growth research is that when a study
assumes a linear relationship between aid and growth, then aid is
likely to have little or no effect. However, studies found that aid
works better in countries with stronger policies and institutions.
These conditional studies have gained much popular support,
suggesting that aid allocation can make a substantial difference.
Also, studies that assume diminishing returns of aid and allow for
heterogeneity of aid tend to ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant
relationship (Asiedu and Nandwa, 2007; Michaelowa and Weber,
2006).
Future research might focus on speciﬁc areas in which aid can
have a direct effect. The impact of education aid in particular is
more likely to be observed in the long term. Data should be
available on details of programmes, such as types of aid (e.g.,
training programme, budget support, grant or loan, etc.), so that it
can be differentiated among programme characteristics. Since
there are major concerns regarding education quality, there is an
increasing need for more and better data on educational quality
such as learning outcomes, which currently are restricted to upper
middle-income countries. Many children complete primary school
without becoming literate (UNESCO, 2012). Therefore, it is crucial
to measure learning outcomes to see the effect of educational aid,
hence the need for achievement assessments. But most conspicu-
ous is the absence of aid’s impact on the social outcomes of
education––better citizenship, honesty, and social cohesion
(Heyneman, 2002/3).
5 As UNESCO has a biannual budget, the annual budget for education is much
smaller than this ﬁgure. UNESCO’s education budget was only US$54 million in each
of 2008 and 2009 (17 per cent of total UNESCO budget), of which only US + $16.5
million was allocated for operational activities (Fredriksen, 2010).
6 Rawls’ (1971) second principle of justice states that public beneﬁts should be
targeted so that the greatest beneﬁt would be captured by the least advantaged.
Assisting a country with problems of primary education when the same country is a
nuclear power suggests that the internal priorities are not sufﬁciently re-
distributive to deserve assistance from the world community.
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evaluating aid projects and for future policymaking, as many
policy decisions are often based on limited evidence (Banerjee and
He, 2008). However, we should not restrict our decision to hard
evidence only, as educational outcomes should be observed in the
long run. Longitudinal data should be ideal to conduct further
research. It is also necessary to consider the deeply rooted
problems of foreign aid in the recipient countries, such as
corruption and a culture that does not value education.
5. Problems with education aid
While it is difﬁcult to assess the overall effectiveness of
education aid, it is easier to identify the problems that undermine
efforts to successfully implement the programmes it funds.
5.1. Institutional imbalance and overlap
There is both imbalance and duplication in the mandates of the
many institutions involved in education aid. Some have mandates
covering only the wealthier parts of the world (such as OECD)
while others have regional mandates in Africa, Asia and Latin
America, creating funding imbalances that do not necessarily
respond to areas of need. Still other organizations, such as UNESCO,
have worldwide mandates, but are burdened by weak governance
and a disconnect between the few member states that pay for the
organization and the many others that vote on a one-vote-per-
country basis on how the budget is allocated. This disconnect
between those who pay and those who beneﬁt makes it difﬁcult to
set priorities or maintain professional standards.
Meanwhile, lack of coordination between institutions at various
levels of aid distribution leads to duplication and at times even
conﬂict of aid efforts. In Kyrgyzstan, the Asian Development Bank
and the World Bank both launched education textbook projects in
the same country, with the result being that one part of the country
used ADB-sponsored textbooks, while the other used World Bank-
sponsored textbooks. Project preparation, appraisal, staff training,
technical assistance and evaluation were conducted separately, in
spite of the fact that the project implementation authorities were
situated only minutes apart.
5.2. Information capacity
Education systems cannot perform professionally without
reliable information, but there is a widening gap in the ability
of countries to provide this information, with the result being that
in many instances education data are unreliable (Heyneman and
Lykins, 2008). For example, there are no accurate counts of school
attendance by student age, no accurate information on unit
expenditures, little evidence of trends in academic achievement
and wide variation in their quality from one part of the world to
another. As a result, it is difﬁcult to map education progress in
terms of enrolment, completion and efﬁciency (Heyneman, 1999).
5.3. Weakened domestic institutions
In some cases, instead of strengthening domestic institutions,
aid can actually weaken them (Heyneman, 2006a). Policy decisions
can be left to external authorities as a way of avoiding difﬁcult
decisions and controversy, since it is politically safer to blame
external authorities if things go wrong. In the 1960s, it was
common to suggest that local authorities did not have the technical
experience to make complex policy decisions. Today, however,
such claims of local incapacity are not as viable. Local experts are
perfectly capable of making policy decisions, yet their develop-
ment is often handicapped by the tendency to rely on internationalauthorities and foreign consultants often have little understanding
of the national contexts.
5.4. Funding shortfalls and aid volatility
In terms of the portion of the nation’s economy, Britain’s
programme of assistance is three times the size of that of the US
and half again the size of the assistance from Germany (Economist,
The, 2012: 60). The total of UNESCO budget of US$989 million5 is
about one-half the budget of an American research university
(Heyneman, 2011a). Though the World Bank allocates 20 times
this amount to education programmes each year, the portion of
loans it allocates to education is only 4 per cent, a level no higher
than it was 20 years ago. In addition to being insufﬁcient,
education aid varies in parallel fashion with domestic priorities
and military and commercial interests. There are also many
examples of education aid being diverted, as well as instances of
graft and corruption pervading the education sector.
5.5. Dependency
In some countries, education aid has created dependency. In
2008, overall aid was greater than 10 per cent of GDP in
21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa and exceeded domestic public
spending in one out of three countries. In terms of education
assistance, aid constituted 70 per cent of the domestic education
budget in Gambia, 66 per cent in Mozambique, 60 per cent in
Kenya, 55 per cent in Zambia, and 51 per cent in Rwanda
(Fredriksen, 2011). This level of dependency creates problems of
many kinds, the most important of which is the impression that
national sovereignty has been ceded to external authorities.
5.6. Inconsistency
China received US$697 million in educational aid in 2007, while
India received US$423 million. Yet these countries have sufﬁcient
resources to ﬁnance space programmes, nuclear arsenals and
militaries of signiﬁcant size. The question is why these countries
cannot ﬁnance their educational requirements by reordering their
domestic priorities6.
5.7. Inter-donor coordination
Another counterproductive inﬂuence has been donor coordi-
nation, by which donors combine programmes and direct them to a
coordinated purpose (Collier, 2007: 101). Though duplication is a
problem in its own right, excessive donor coordination can reduce
choice and competition, while leaving an aid-receiving nation
more vulnerable to mistakes in direction due to short-term fads in
development priorities (Heyneman, 2010). Single-issue aid priori-
tization also results in little assistance being directed to regions
where that issue is not the problem. With regard to education aid,
where basic education is not the most important priority, such as
Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and the Middle East,
foreign aid to education has been ﬂuctuating over time, however, it
eventually decreased and nearly disappeared.
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Inter-donor coordination may lead to an unanticipated conse-
quence, the danger of a single emphasis on basic education as
being the highest priority for education aid programmes world-
wide. It might perhaps help illustrate the nature of the problem by
considering another sector as a comparison (Heyneman, 2009,
2010, 2012a).
Foreign assistance to the health sector could not be successful if
the only priority considered legitimate was assistance to rural
health clinics. Rural clinics function as part of an interdependent
system that includes hospitals, research and development facili-
ties, an efﬁcient pharmaceutical industry and networks to care for
speciﬁc signiﬁcant diseases, such as HIV/AIDS or malaria.
Developing a sustainable system of specialized training and
expertise in health economics, epidemiology and health statistics
is as necessary as rural health clinics. The same diversity of
components that makes for successful foreign assistance to the
health sector is also applicable to aid for the environment,
agriculture, transport and public administration.
What pertains in these sectors is also true of education.
However, since the 1990s, the donor community has become
precoccupied by with basic education and education-for-all
(Fig. 2), an international statement of intent signed in 1990 com-
mitting signatory countries to ensure that all children are enrolled
in school with an adequate quality by a certain date. That date has
arrived, and the results have not been up to the original aspirations
(UNESCO, 2007).
There is certainly a need for basic education, and education aid
should not neglect it. But what began as common sense has turned
into an ideology in which other education subsectors were treated
as heresy. Agencies that express the desire to assist secondary or
higher education, research or statistics, medical education or
engineering, are now treated as having a disregard not only for the
world’s poor but also for rational economic policy.
This could have been offset if other agencies had exercised
intellectual leadership. But they did not. The resulting conformist
behaviour is one reason why the level of educational assistance as a
portion of overall aid has stagnated (Table 1), and why assistance
to higher education, where there are natural ﬁscal economies of
scale, has slipped to only 6 per cent of World Bank education
lending in 2010. It also explains why organizations with interests
in subsectors other than basic education, such as universities and
vocational associations, have lost interest in development.
The effect of this has been disruptive to the effort to achieve a
consensus regarding the role of education in national economic
development. It has to the contrary splintered the education aidFig. 2. Allocation of educational aid by subsector over time. Note: Ccommunity into warring camps, some arguing for basic education
as if it were a holy war, while others criticizing international
agencies such as the World Bank for providing false evidence to
justify its view. UNESCO, UNICEF and the major national aid
agencies are equally responsible. The international community had
already allowed the education statistics function of the United
Nations to all but disappear in the 1990s, making it difﬁcult to
monitor progress with comparable statistical standards used in
other sectors. No agency has been sufﬁciently courageous to
deviate from the accepted education-for-all message. None has
taken the lead in demanding that education policy be more
balanced. Some agencies, such as UNESCO and the International
Institute of Education Planning, have been so focused on the least
developed countries that they have virtually recused themselves
from making a contribution to education development anywhere
else.
The absence of professional leadership in education aid has
resulted in the development community shifting its energy and
attention to other priorities, notably human rights, the environ-
ment and good governance. The absence of a balanced develop-
ment strategy for the education sector has also meant that private
organizations, including major associations of universities, tech-
nical institutes and private businesses, have taken only a marginal
interest in development on the grounds that the development
community had little interest––or in the case of private business, a
hostility-towards what they could offer.
7. Using aspirational targets to plan development
From the ﬁrst meetings in Thailand objectives in 1990,
objectives of Education-for-All have been established by country
representatives together and setting targets. In 2000 these
included the Millennium Development Goals and in 2015 they
will include the Sustainable Development Goals. The agreements,
in effect, are statements of aspirations. They have no basis in law.
No sanctions are associated with the failure to attain the intended
targets. The promise to allocate resources is imbalanced because
they fall speciﬁcally on donors but not recipients. The interest of
the recipients therefore may be to increase the levels of donor
commitment by increasing the breadth and the severity of the
targets. The goal of full school enrolment in 1990 was expanded in
2000 to include eight goals including lowering rates of poverty and
hunger. The Sustainable Development Goals have not yet been
decided but original proposals included 17 of them, ﬁrst with
212 and then with 169 targets. These include goals pertaining to
urbanization, infrastructure, standards of governance, income
inequality and climate change. This has raised many concerns.onstant prices (2010 USD in millions). Source: OECD DAC CRS.
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likely they are to be treated seriously. A second is that some in
education are un-measurable. Goal 4.7 for instance proposes:
By 2030 ensure all learners acquire knowledge and skills needed
to promote sustainable development, including among others
through education for sustainable development and sustainable
lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture
of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation
of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable
development’’ (Economist, The, March 28th 2015).
It is the case that the goal set in 2000 for the reduction of
poverty was indeed met by 2010. In 1990 about 43% of the world’s
population lived in poverty. This was reduced to 33% in 2000 and to
21% in 2010 (Economist, The, June 1, 2013). But is it the case that
setting a goal and increased allocations of international aid was
responsible for reducing poverty? Reductions in poverty within
China during this period accounted for 75% of the world’s poverty
reduction and although China is a recipient of foreign aid, including
IDA, this had little to do with the reduction of Chinese poverty.
Chinese poverty was reduced through economic growth and
economic growth was largely attributable to international trade. In
terms of the world at large, for every dollar spent on trade
liberalization resulted in $US 2,011 dollars in beneﬁts in
development targets. For every dollar spent on providing greater
preschool education resulted in $32 in beneﬁts in development
targets ((Economist, The, January 24, 2015). This is not to suggest
that preschool education programs are unworthy of investment; it
is to suggest that many of the goals can be attained through
mechanisms other than foreign aid.
In the eyes of some, foreign aid is an industry, a vested interest
with its own sense of priorities governed by the status quo in
which the interests of experts are aligned with those of dictators
(Easterly, 2014a,b). The argument is that planning by experts such
as in the use of the Sustainable Development Goals is based on
patronization of developing countries. The goals call for more
resources to be made available from wealthy parts of the world and
sent to countries where they may be subject to systematically
stolen by those in power. The experts supporting this industry are
well compensated and moreover have the self satisfaction of
performing an act of charity. This industry, it is held, is self serving.
It does not require budgetary reallocations in developing countries
or any tangible sacriﬁces. The effect is that developing countries
can act as negotiators for beneﬁts someone else is supplying. The
result in some ways is that
each country and aid lobbyist has a target for its particular
bugbear and is now unwilling to give it up unless others give up
theirs. Something for everyone has produced too much for
anyone. Making matters worse, some developing countries
think each extra goal will come with a pot of money, so the
more goals, the more aid (Economist, The, March 28, 2015).
8. Options
8.1. Ending foreign aid
Some critics have argued for eliminating development aid
(Moyo, 2009; Easterly, 2014a,b; Ramalingam, 2014). Some suggest
that it is more likely to obstruct development (Bauer, 1972); or that
it is a waste of resources (Dichter, 2003); that it has no measurable
effect on economic growth (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005); that
helps support bad governments and enrich elites (Easterly, 2006).
Bauer (1972) suggests that aid creates dependency, fosters
corruption and exacerbates imperfections in local markets. Moyo
(2009) suggests that aid can increase the chances of domesticconﬂict and add to inﬂationary pressures. Although some
successful aid programs are acknowledged, the critics suggest
that aid should be replaced by international trade (Bauer, 1972;
Dichter, 2003; Easterly, 2006; Moyo, 2009).
Although some ﬁndings support the argument that aid has no
effect on national growth, Burnside and Dollar (1997)’s ﬁnd that
aid was effective in countries with sound economic and social
policies. Nevertheless, their ﬁndings were challenged by Dalgaard
and Hansen (2001) who suggest that the Burnside and Dollar
(1997) results were affected by changes to their samples.
Most studies look at the effects of aid on macro-economic
growth. But aid may affect other speciﬁc elements, such as school
enrolment. The studies discussed in Section 4 shows that
education aid had moderately positive effect on school enrolment.
As mentioned above, even the most severe critics acknowledge
aid successes, and many of those have been in the education sector.
Dichter (2003) and Easterly (2006) noted that access to primary
education has helped to change the rate of female to male literacy
rate over the past thirty years. In the 1990s, for the ﬁrst time, there
was a decline in the fertility rate of the developing countries which
is associated with greater access to schooling (Dichter, 2003).
Easterly (2006) acknowledges some successful cash transfer
programs to enrol students in schools in Bangladesh and Kenya.
While much of the success of education aid has been on increasing
the enrolment in schools, the aid effectiveness on the quality of
learning still remains questionable (Riddell, 2012).
8.2. Improving education aid
Donor efforts to confront the problems of aid have resulted in an
important series of recommendations for improvement in the ‘post-
2015 era’. While allocations to education within the aid portfolio
declined by seven percent between 2010 and 2011 (UNESCO, 2013),
the new EFA goals call for aid to include speciﬁc targets for each
donor of about one percent of GDP (UNU-WIDER, 2014).
Some have called for humanitarian aid to continue speciﬁcally
for the social sectors—health, water, sanitation, education and
social protection, in part on the evidence of recent enrolment
increases in Sub-Saharan Africa from 57 to 78% for boys and from
50 to 74% for girls in just 20 years (UNU-WIDER, 2014). Others have
suggested that aid be improved by learning from ‘complex
adaptive systems’, essentially the process of learning from past
mistakes (Ramalingam, 2014). Some have suggested that the next
been challenge is not enrolment but learning and in fact that
Millennium Development Goals might be replaced by the
Millennium Learning Goals (Barrett, 2011). New criteria for
education development have been suggested by Unterhalter
(2013) and by the Brookings/UNESCO Learning Metrics Task Force
(Brookings, 2013). Parallel with the new World Bank Education
Policy Paper (World Bank, 2012), the task force calls for new,
quickly administered, criterion-reference achievement tests
throughout developing countries and new indicators of progress.
These might include: (i) measures of completion, reading
comprehension at the end of primary school, (ii) better use of
net enrolment rates; (iii) tests of reading and numeracy, (iv) early
childhood development, (v) citizenship values and (vi) exposure to
learning opportunities across seven different domains (Brookings,
2013). Although the testing for learning quality and more accurate
measurements of attainment have been long overdue, doubts
remain as to the logistical implications and potential side effects of
global testing (Barrett, 2011; Heyneman and Lee, 2012). It remains
an anomaly too that the United States, being a large sources of
demand for better educational statistics, is currently not even a
member of UNESCO, the United Nations organization charged with
the responsibility for improving education statistics, hence the
scepticism over the realism of the calls for global testing.
7 This policy may be inconsistent with that of Britain whose development
assistance agency (DFID) is restricted from taking British commercial interests into
account.
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speciﬁc to being policy based. The former was judged to be slow
and overly directive in the sense that it tended to micro-manage
the implementation of projects. But basing assistance on changes
in sector-wide policies has not solved past problems and has raised
new and unintended concerns. Policy-based assistance has
developed a reputation for being invasive in the sense that the
conditions are often set by a process characterized by unequal
access to information and methods of analysis between lender and
recipient. Moreover policy-based aid has increased the scale by
which resources can be diverted away from intended goals. Lastly,
policy-based aid has not augmented the courage of development
assistance agencies to cease assistance when problems or short-
falls in objectives have been encountered. What shifted was the
magnitude of the assistance and the degree to which borrowers
could be held accountable ex post facto.
Among the more important innovations in designing aid
programs has been characterized as
Cash on Delivery or Results-Based-Aid (RBA). The idea is
relatively simple. If a recipient country wants to reach the objective
it should be willing to reallocate its own resources to make
progress reaching it. This is a test of political will, the ingredient
judged to be missing in many programs of past assistance. It also
breaks the interdependence between ‘experts and the dictators’ in
that the mechanisms of what works is relatively unimportant.
Policy borrowing through conditionality can be replaced by simply
noting the improvements in the target objective and the allocation
of assistance ex post facto. Some suggest that this might free up
accountants and managers who might be better employed running
public services (Economist, The, May 23, 2015). Though such
programs have only recently been designed, early results are
encouraging in the case of protecting tropical forests (Seymour and
Busch, 2014), ﬁnance (Development Impact Working Group, 2013)
and Energy (Savedoff, 2015). In one review of the literature,
authors have pointed out that traditional aid with its emphasis on
how payments are used may be a case of ‘double demanding’ in
that accounting is required for both inputs and outputs. (Perakis
and Savedoff, 2015). What motivates countries to achieve better
performance with Results-Based-Aid (RBA)? Some suggest that it
may be attributable to four possible motives: (i) pecuniary
interests (countries need the money), (ii) attention focus (because
the connection between funds and results is so clear politicians and
administrators can more easily focus on them), (iii) accountability
(RBA are more transparent to the public which therefore allows
them to more easily hold their governments accountable, and (iv)
recipient discretion (the ability of the recipient to choose among
mechanisms of implementation which is closer to local knowledge,
capacity and innovation) (Perakis and Savedoff, 2015). One
example of RBA in the education sector is a program to augment
secondary school enrolment and examination performance in
Ethiopia sponsored by DFID. $US 157 was paid to Ethiopia for each
additional pupil sitting for the school-leaving examination; and
$US 157 for each additional pupil who passed. Two years after the
program began 45,000 additional pupils took the exam and an
additional 42,000 passed the examination (Economist The, 2015).
The results are too recent and small scale to conclude that RBA
is a viable option to the traditional means of distributing aid. Most
RBA programs have been directed to businesses, NGO’s households
and communities; only a few so far have been directed to
governments. Of the six government-directed programs analyzed
each achieved ‘some success’. Deforestation has declined in Brazil,
more Ethiopian children are completing secondary school and
more children in Central America have been immunized. However
the programs promised too little money to motivate governments
for pecuniary reasons, did not have the transparency to motivate
for constituent accountability reasons, continued to involvefunders in program design to test the motivation of recipient
discretion. It is speculated that the motivation hinged on the clarity
and simplicity of the results suggesting that increased attention
to outcomes among staff of both funding implementing agencies
has been the key motivation thus far.
The education sector today constitutes a large enterprise, which
includes programmes (curricula which lead to a degree or
certiﬁcate), products (books, computer software) and services
(testing, test preparation, consulting). Combined they constitute
the sixth largest service export of the US and a topic of signiﬁcant
concern for discussion within the WTO (Heyneman, 1997, 2001).
Schools are the world’s largest source of employment and a large
source of demand for computer software, furniture, chemicals,
books and electronic equipment (Heyneman, 2001). Education aid
has not taken sufﬁcient account of the magnitude of the sector’s
commercial vibrancy (Heyneman, 2011b).
Because foreign aid has a poor reputation politically, suggestions
on how to improve it must be placed in context of political realism.
For example, by one report, the desire of the American public to
reduce foreign aid ranked greater than their concern over nuclear
war (Moyo, 2009: 74). About half of the British public believe that
‘Britain should look after itself and leave poorer countries to sort
themselves out’ (Economist, The, 2012: 60). The reputation of aid
generally mirrors that of international organizations. Those agencies
responsible for education issues have been slow to seek a
diversiﬁcation in resources and hence are less sustainable (Heyne-
man, 2011a) They have neglected areas of their responsibility which
OECD countries need them for most (Heyneman, 2003a,b), and
instead of facing fulﬁlling their mandate of adding to the world’s
knowledge of education, they have concentrated on education in the
world’s most vulnerable countries which are least likely to be critical
of their advice or the professionalism of their analyses (Heyneman
and Pelczar, 2005).
On the other hand, the world cannot simply ignore the
education needs of the most vulnerable. If there is justice in
ﬁnancing the educational opportunity of one’s neighbour, there is
justiﬁcation for considering any deserving family to be one’s
neighbour (Heyneman, 2003c, 2006b). The problem is that
programmes which limit aid to areas or countries in which aid
will be effective leaves out most of the world’s poor (Heyneman,
2003c, 2004a), and private philanthropy does not constitute
sufﬁcient resources to make up for the scarcity of public
philanthropy (Heyneman, 2005).
But there are a number of ways in which education aid might be
improved. They include better strategy, better innovation, and more
courageous admission of sensitive but necessary issues. They begin
with broadening the scope of education aid beyond the current
ﬁxation on basic education. Development assistance agencies need
to take a leadership position with respect to articulating a diversity
of educational priorities. Bilateral agencies should pioneer areas in
which their countries excel and have a comparative advantage, such
as technology, higher education, vocational education and private
education7. Agencies with speciﬁc educational mandates, such as
UNESCO, need to reiterate the interdependence of education
subsectors, both public and private, and the importance of all of
them. They should also attempt to live up to their real mandate and
speak to education problems and challenges worldwide, including in
the US, Europe and the industrial democracies. By limiting their
attention to developing countries, they fail to live up to their true
purpose: to speak for education globally. Finally, the next frontier for
education assistance will be to assist countries in thinking through
the complexities of establishing world-class universities. This is an
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Development assistance agencies have been remiss in terms of
gathering the necessary data to monitor and evaluate the changes
in education policy. This inadequacy has been due, in part, to the
tendency of development assistance agencies to ﬁnance the
evaluation efforts out of project funds. This is commonly resisted
by recipient countries, perhaps on the grounds that aid for data and
research is lower in priority than aid for more tangible products
and services. However, the new Education Sector Policy paper
published by the World Bank (2012) is a step in a new direction. It
calls for a set of grants to offset the costs of collecting regular data
on education operations whether ﬁnanced from domestic or
international sources.
Perhaps lending to the private sector (such as through the IFC)
and specialists education venture capital might play an important
role. Learn Capital (leancapital.com), Rethink Education (rteduca-
tion.com) and New Schools Venture Fund (newschools.org) are
illustrations. Their focus is on the development of private providers
of educational goods and services (training, testing, textbooks and
other equipment, education software and afterschool pedagogies,
etc.). They augment the proﬁts of local education companies. They
assist in the delivery of better education, and they at the same time,
they avoid the typical relationships generated by charities.
In high aid-impact countries such as Gambia, where foreign
assistance accounts for 70 per cent of the public spending on
education, or in conﬂict countries such as Liberia, foreign aid
should be taken as an indicator that the country has already in
essence lost its sovereignty over the education sector. In these
cases, a trusteeship council could manage the education sector
until such time as domestic institutions are sufﬁciently capable
and sustainable to be effective. In technically competent, yet poor
countries with signiﬁcant military expenditures, educational
assistance should be reviewed. This is, for instance, part of the
justiﬁcation used by the UK to cease assistance to India8.
The most recent education policy paper of the World Bank
recommends a worldwide priority on gathering data to monitor
and evaluate educational progress (World Bank, 2011). This seems
sensible. The monopolistic position of the World Bank which has
the resources to provide the lion’s share of the analyses on which
projects are based, and the lion’s share of the resources for the
projects themselves, should be broken. The number and mandates
of the multilateral development agencies should also be rational-
ized. Overlapping authority should be reduced, while basic
functions on which all depend, such as statistics, evaluation and
research, should be coordinated across institutions.
This could be done in three ways. One is to follow the
recommendations of the Meltzer Commission (2000). Their report
recommended that the World Bank be responsible for analysing
development problems and making recommendations but that the
projects themselves should be identiﬁed, managed and ﬁnanced
through the regional development banks and the new Asian
Infrstructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In essence this would de-link
the analytic work from the lending programme and thus allow a
natural set of checks and balances to occur within the countries
themselves.
Another option would be to place the analytic capacity within
the countries themselves by having them decide what to analyse
and who should perform the analyses. This applies to all lending,
not only to lending for education. The Asian Development Bank for
instance, makes grants for the technical assistance that underpins
lending9. The World Bank might grant monies for analytic work in8 Highlighting the sensitivity of the donor/recipient relationship, the president of
India described Britain’s assistance programme as ‘a peanut’ (Economist, 2012. 60).
9 The quality of the analyses is not guaranteed however.the same way. Countries would request proposals just as they do
for other kinds of technical assistance. Bids would emerge from
universities, private companies, foundations and perhaps other
public authorities, both local and international.
It might be useful to consider a way to develop policies, which
underpin education lending by diversifying it within the UN
system. Were the policy analytic capacity augmented (Mundy,
1998, 1999, 2002, 2002/2003) UNESCO might be responsible for
the education policies on which World Bank lending could then be
established. This option would avoid the problems of the current
monopoly of both analytic and lending authority now enjoyed by
the World Bank. This would place professional responsibility for
education policy within the institution whose terms of reference
cover the full gamut of the education sector, not just the activities
related to internal and external efﬁciency10. Although efﬁciency is
an essential element in a country’s education policy, policies on
efﬁciency alone cannot cover the full range of professional
responsibilities which constitute a normal part of the education
sector. This may also pertain to the health and agriculture sectors
where UN agencies compete with the World Bank for setting
policy.
Policies for rationalizing the functions of bilateral agencies are
constitutionally different. They remain the prerogative of autono-
mous domestic governments. The greater the diversity of bilateral
participation – with new agencies in the Russian Federation, Brazil,
China and Korea – the more autonomous their policymaking can be
expected to remain. However, all bilateral agencies are open to
consensus-building and to collaboration when the goals overlap.
9. Conclusion
The potential of education aid remains signiﬁcant over time. It
is less controversial than many sectors – industry, tourism,
agriculture, banking – where the separation between private and
government responsibilities is less clear. Research results on the
importance of human capital investments, though challenge and
perhaps non-linear, remain signiﬁcant and constant. Investments
in education continue to elicit signiﬁcant monetary and non-
monetary rewards both for the individual and for the wider
community. The individual beneﬁts from comparative advantages
in the labour market, in adaptability in times of economic
transition and in spin-offs in terms of household efﬁciencies,
beneﬁcial health practices and inter-generation savings. The
community beneﬁts from greater productivity, increased political
participation and social cohesion.
However, the problems of education aid are non-trivial. In
general they parallel problems of development aid generally.
Corruption, overdependence on aid, lack of institution-building
and faddish ideologies are known in other sectors as well. The RBA
approach has signiﬁcant potential to replace the traditional
project-based assistance. Reconstruction aid, however, should be
considered separate from development aid. Reforming and
rationalizing the international development assistance organiza-
tions is likely to be an inevitable consequence of the post
2015 agenda.
The key to appreciating the past half-century of education
assistance is perhaps to acknowledge that what commenced as a
novel idea is today taken to be the norm: human capital, in the
form of educated populations, is a sine qua non of development.
Basic education has become largely universal, while gender equity
in education access is close to being realized. Furthermore,10 The counter-argument to this option is the fact that member states of UNESCO
are represented by the ministers of education whereas the member states of the
World Bank are represented by the ﬁnance ministers. Ministers of education have
no authority to decide policies of inter-sector resource allocation.
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providing quality of education. Policymakers now must turn their
sights on what the next half-century of education aid can
realistically accomplish in an imperfect institutional environment
in which there are signiﬁcant and legitimate demands for the
allocation of scarce resources towards domestic needs. In addition
it is reasonable to expect commitment towards the reallocation of
local priorities. The era of newly independent nations is over; what
lies ahead of us is a new era in which all nations will have similarAppendix A. Appendices
A.1. A. List of acronyms
AU African Union
AusAid Australian Agency for International Development
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DFID Department for International Development
ECA Europe and Central Asia
ETS education testing service
EU European Union
EUROSTAT Statistical Ofﬁce of the European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
GDP gross domestic product
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA International Development Agency
IEA International Association for the Evaluation of Education Ac
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KOICA Korea International Cooperation Agency
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NCES National Centre for Education Statistics
NGO non-government organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SEAMEO Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
UIS UNESCO Institute of Statistics
UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientiﬁc, and Cultural Organizat
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WB World Bank Group
WTO World Trade Organization
A.2. B. List of basic facts on educational aid of the multilateral, regional 
Name Major priorities in the education sector Date whe
began
Multilate
regional 
UNESCO Education for all, quality and inclusive
education, education for sustainable
development
1945 
UNICEF Basic education and gender equality 1946 
World Bank Basic education, higher education,
vocational, in-service training, pre-school
1944 
ILO Skills and knowledge for youth
employment, competitiveness, growth
1919 expectations for maintaining the health and education of their own
populations.
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USAID Improving early grade reading, access to
higher education, education for youth in
crisis and conﬂict situations
1961 1348,000,000 2.80 Department of State-
USAID Joint
summary of
performance and
ﬁnancial information
ﬁscal year 2010
DFID (UK) Access to primary school and lower
secondary school, completing primary
education
1961 960,053,625 14.50 DFID Annual Report
and Accounts 2011–
2012
CIDA (Canada) Primary education, education policy and
administrative management, education
facilities, teacher training, vocational
training, higher education
1968 418,290,000 11.60 Departmental
Performance Report
2010–2011/
Statistical Report on
international
assistance 2010–
2011
SIDA (Sweden) Primary education, education policy and
administration, vocational education,
higher education
1965 139,000,000 4 Annual Report 2011
KOICA (South Korea) Expanding opportunities for basic
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improving environment for higher
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1991 100,128,000 24.50 KOICA Aid Statistics
2011
NORDAD (Norway) Basic education (the largest portion), post-
secondary education, secondary education
1960 255,343,467 5 Norwegian
Development Aid
2011 by sector
AusAID (Australia) Development scholarships (39 of
education budget), basic education (28),
education governance and sector-wide
activities, technical vocational education,
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1974 NA 17 AusAID Annual
Report 2010-11
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Name Major priorities in the education sector Date when
it began
Monetary commitment
in education in recent
ﬁscal yr (US$)
% of overall
activities on
education
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Netherlands Basic education, vocational education,
disadvantaged groups
1965 471,319,000 7.7 OECD DAC
2010 Creditor
Reporting System
The Belgian Development
Cooperation
Higher education, vocational and
technical education, primary education
through ‘global partnership for
education’ (fast track initiative)
1985 136,000,000 10.0 Annual Report
2011
Austrian Development
Agency
Vocational training and higher
education
2004 11,590,000 10.43 Annual Report
2009
FINIDA (Finland) No priority in education in
development programmes, primary
education, quality education
NA NA Annual Report
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French Development
Agency (France)
Basic education, vocational training,
higher education
136,284,000*** 1.6* Annual Report
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Germany Primary education, technical and
vocational education, higher education
1,731,630,000 15 OECD CRS
Luxemburg Vocational training and access to
employment, basic education and
literacy
1978 26,123,674.96 28.65 Luxembourg
Development
Agency Leaﬂet,
2010
NZAID (New Zealand) Teacher training, vocational education,
higher education
2002 146,500,000 25 2010/11 Year in
Review
Spain Basic education and training 1988 NA NA
Swiss Agency for
Development and
Cooperation
Basic education, vocational skills and
development
1944 37,966,000 1.98 OECD CRS
Irish Aid (Ireland) Universal primary education, public
education systems, equality in
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1974 52,476,720 9.4 Annual Report
2011
The year when bilateral aid began and the establishment of bilateral agency can be different. Ofﬁcial websites tend to show the establishment of their organization. Thus, the
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education projects in the annual report.
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